Myanmar coup 4th anniversary: China repeatedly intervenes in civil war, 'Sinophobia' sentiment heats up in Myanmar society

It has been four years since Myanmar's military strongman Min Aung Hlaing staged a coup on February 1, 2021, and the people who refused to compromise have retreated into the jungles to cooperate with the "Ethnic Armed Organizations" (EAOs) in armed resistance, marking the fourth year of this struggle. Four years of brutal warfare have brought devastation to Myanmar. According to a 2024 UN human rights report, the civil war has created nearly two million internally displaced persons, and more than one-third of the country's population, about 18 million people, are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance.

In the intense fighting in northern Myanmar, a ceasefire agreement between the Myanmar military and resistance forces was reached on January 18, 2025, thanks to Chinese mediation. This article, based on the long-term observations of independent journalist Yang Zhiqiang on the ground in Myanmar's war zones, explores what effect Chinese influence has had in this civil war that has been almost forgotten internationally. What does Myanmar society think about China's frequent involvement in the conflict?

From the "Operation 1027" that began on October 27, 2023, to the ceasefire agreement reached in January 2025, over a year later, China has intervened in Myanmar's civil war through various means, causing shifts in attitudes toward China among supporters of both the resistance forces and the Myanmar military.

A exiled resistance fighter told me shortly after Operation 1027 began: "You're from Taiwan, so I'm a bit embarrassed to say this, but I think China really did the right thing this time. They helped us resist tyranny, and I'm grateful."

At that time, I could only smile and offer my best wishes.

Operation 1027 was launched by the "Three Brotherhood Alliance," composed of three EAOs in northern Shan State, Myanmar. These three forces, located along the China-Myanmar border, are uniformly equipped with Chinese-made weapons and gear. Compared to the mostly American-made equipment that Karen State armed groups in eastern Myanmar purchase from the black market in Thailand, they are more deeply influenced by China.

After the military junta came to power through the 2021 coup, China repeatedly demanded that the junta crack down on scam syndicates in northern Myanmar, but the military consistently brushed it off. Under pressure from domestic public opinion, the Chinese government turned to negotiate with the northern resistance forces, tacitly allowing them to attack the Myanmar military in exchange for a joint crackdown on the scam syndicates.

▌Operation 1027 changed the three-way balance among Myanmar's military junta, the opposition, and China

The military junta that came to power in the 2021 coup initially favored Russia as its big brother. Junta leader Min Aung Hlaing made multiple visits to Russia and conducted several joint naval exercises with Russia, attempting to shake off China's geopolitical influence. However, seeing the northern resistance forces growing closer to China, the junta allowed pro-government civil groups to stage protests against China's "interference in internal affairs" in November 2023, indirectly expressing dissatisfaction with China.

In contrast, after the 2021 coup, anti-government forces had suspected China of being the mastermind behind the coup and staged multiple anti-China protests, including burning flags, maintaining a cautious distance from China.

But after Operation 1027 at the end of 2023, the National Unity Government (NUG), a government-in-exile formed by former cabinet members and lawmakers, issued a statement on January 1, 2024, supporting the "One China Principle" in an attempt to win China's support for Myanmar's anti-government forces.

At that time, several friends from the NUG told me over dinner that although they felt sorry for Taiwan, they believed the decision to support the One China Principle statement was correct. For a while, a mood spread among anti-junta forces that "with China's endorsement, overthrowing the junta is within reach."

In addition to the northern resistance forces beginning to counterattack the Myanmar military, Karen State in the east and Rakhine State in the west also launched large-scale counteroffensives, successively seizing many junta outposts and inflicting heavy losses on the Myanmar military.

When the northern resistance forces advanced southward to Lashio, the second-largest city in Shan State, in July 2024, reports emerged that China had asked the resistance forces to stop their offensive. Even when the resistance forces had suffered over a thousand casualties and were on the verge of capturing Lashio, China demanded that they "return" Lashio to the Myanmar military.

The anti-government forces, which had placed high hopes on China, began to debate China's role in Myanmar's civil war.
▌A series of news events intensified anti-China sentiment in Myanmar society

In June 2024, the well-known Myanmar human rights group "Justice for Myanmar" revealed that Chinese tech companies had helped the Myanmar military junta enhance surveillance technology and strengthen its ability to monitor the population, stoking distrust of China in Myanmar society.

In August 2024, a record of a secret meeting between a Chinese special envoy and the Wa State Special Region (a neutral EAO) was leaked online. In the meeting minutes, the Chinese envoy's tone resembled that of a heavenly dynasty commanding a vassal state, intensifying dissatisfaction with China's arrogant attitude in Myanmar society.

Additionally, to pressure the northern resistance forces into a ceasefire agreement with the Myanmar military, China closed all China-Myanmar border crossings in October of the same year, causing prices and fuel costs to soar in areas controlled by the resistance forces.

During that period, Myanmar's social media was flooded with messages condemning China's interference in internal affairs.

On October 18, 2024, unknown individuals attacked the Chinese consulate in Mandalay (also known as Wag City), Myanmar's second-largest city, with grenades. Although no one claimed responsibility, according to The Irrawaddy, the attackers were likely pro-military militias.

In November 2024, the Burmese-language BBC revealed that four Chinese armed security companies had entered Myanmar to protect Chinese-funded projects such as deep-water ports and oil and gas pipelines. However, the presence of foreign private armed groups on Myanmar's soil deepened concerns of "Chinaphobia" among both junta supporters and anti-government forces.

▌The Myanmar military turns back to China for support; the incoming US ambassador to the UN vows to "address" Myanmar's human rights issues

Information about Myanmar's four-year civil war is difficult to accurately compile, and it is widely believed that the death toll is underestimated. According to a conservative estimate by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset (ACLED) in December 2024, at least 73,000 people have been killed, and over 28,000 have been arrested by the junta.

Myanmar's multi-ethnic makeup and its terrain of jungles and mountains make the civil war even more complex. Although the Myanmar military has air superiority and heavy weapons, it still struggles to "annihilate" the resistance forces hiding in the mountains; conversely, the resistance forces, which enjoy widespread social support, lack sophisticated heavy weapons and solid training, making it equally difficult for them to completely defeat the Myanmar military.

Therefore, all sides hope to bring in foreign support to strengthen themselves and overthrow their opponents.

The junta, which had initially pinned its hopes on Russia, saw that the Russia-Ukraine war left Russia preoccupied, and the Russian-backed Assad regime in Syria collapsed in a short time. In November 2024, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing finally made his first visit to China. Voice of America reported that after this visit, the Myanmar military's drone strike capabilities improved, possibly due to Chinese support.

Additionally, Elise Stefanik, the incoming US ambassador to the UN under the new Trump administration, said on January 21 at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing: "When we talk about human rights issues, the Myanmar civil war is at the top of my list to address." This increases the likelihood that the Myanmar issue will receive attention from the new US administration.

But whether the new US administration will extend its hand into China's sphere of influence in 2025 and open another proxy war in Myanmar, the future of Myanmar's civil war remains difficult to see an end to.

Source: global.udn.com/global_vision/story/8663/8520730